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Logistics Transportation is an indispensable step that connects production, 
storage, and the final customers. Plenty of previous research has been done to 
achieve the goals such as low cost, high accuracy in timing, good customer 
service, and low damage rate, within the transportation system. However, most 
of those improvements are on the operational level. There are few supply chain 
collaborations that try to optimize logistics transportation from a strategic level. 
This thesis proposes a new collaboration policy, Carrier Managed 
Transportation (CMT). It is a coordinated relationship between the carrier and 
the clients in a supply chain. As opposed to the traditional approach, where the 
client decides when to request shipments of the products, in CMT, the carrier 
will make these decisions on their behalf through information sharing. 
Due to the complexity in relationships and responsibilities of chain members, 
we divide the business scenarios into four cases and discuss the impact of CMT 
on each case. Comparisons and numerical examples across cases are also 
provided, along with some conclusions regarding the implementation of CMT. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Transportation in logistics and the supply chain 
Transportation is one of the two pillars in the logistics and supply chain 
activities. It is an indispensable step that connects production, storage, and the 
final customers. By moving the required quantity of products to a designated 
location, transportation creates value for those products. Three parties are 
involved in a transportation system: the carrier, the shipper, and the consignee.  
Simply speaking, the carrier is the party who offers transportation services. 
Both the shipper and the consignee are clients to be served. The shipper is the 
party who wants to send out the goods, and the consignee is the one who will 
receive them. That is, the products originate from the shipper, and terminate at 
the consignee. The carrier provides transportation to realize the movement of 
freight between the two parties. 
There are some criteria to define a favorable transportation system: low cost, 
high accuracy in timing, good customer service, and low damage rate. Much 
research has been done at the operational and practical levels to optimize the 
transportation cost. For example, freight consolidation is the most frequently 
applied technique to lower the total expense. This shipment strategy combines 
small deliveries and dispatches them as a larger single load, utilizing scale 




performance from a strategic level. The following figure indicates the parties in a 







In this thesis, we will propose a new strategy that also has the potential to 
better utilize the transportation system. 
1.2  Supply chain collaboration and Carrier Managed Transportation 
Since the mid 1990’s, supply chain collaboration has become a major trend 
of supply chain strategy, which has gained extensive attention from both 
academics and practitioners. Various degrees of coordination have emerged with 
the development of supply chain management. Categorized by logistics activities, 
these are collaborative planning, collaborative forecasting, and collaborative 
replenishment. From the perspective of the whole supply chain, some firms 
merged vertically with companies upstream or downstream in the process of 
coordination, while other collaboration strategies keep the independence of the 
chain members. These coordination strategies are all aimed at reducing costs of 
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the parties involved, building up business relationships, and improving the 
performance of the supply chain. The wide discussion of collaboration has also 
yielded a wealth of concepts, such as vendor managed inventory (VMI), 
Continuous replenishment, Quick response, and Efficient Consumer Response, 
e.g. Daugherty et al. (1999) and Simchi-Levi et al. (2000).  
Among these concepts, VMI is well-known and popular in the industry. 
Under VMI, the supplier is given the required information and the full 
responsibility to maintain the inventory of the buyer. The supplier thus places 
orders on behalf of the buyer. According to Waller et al. (1999), this means that 
the vendor monitors the buyer’s inventory levels (physically or via electronic 
messaging) and, from time to time, makes resupply decisions regarding order 
quantities and shipping. Transactions customarily initiated by the buyer (such as 
purchase orders) are initiated by the supplier. 
The merits of VMI are mentioned in numerous articles. It is often cited that 
VMI has the following benefits: lower inventory levels, faster turnover rates, 
reduced ordering costs, and reduced out-of-stock costs, e.g. Angulo et al. (2004). 
Experience from big companies like Wal-Mart and Procter & Gamble also 
indicated that VMI is beneficial. 
Unfortunately, there is no similar collaboration in transportation practices. 
Most of the time, transportation and distribution are still processed under 




little consideration about the situation of other parties. Meanwhile, the only 
information available is the delivery of orders established by shippers or 
consignees. According to Holweg et al. (2005), this is “The Traditional Supply 
Chain”, i.e. each level of the supply chain operates without considering the 
situation at other tiers. The best performance can be achieved if the supplier 
takes charge of the customer’s inventory replenishment on the operational level, 
and uses this visibility in planning his own supply operations. This type of 
supply chain was classified as “Synchronized Supply”. Now we want to examine 
whether the synchronized supply also has potential in the delivering practices. 
We feel that the principles of VMI also apply in transportation and 
distribution. Therefore, we conceived a similar coordination model, now with the 
relationships among parties in a transportation system. The new concept is 
named “Carrier Managed Transportation”. Literally, it means that the carrier is 
given the responsibility to manage transportation for the clients.  
This new supply chain coordination has not been explored previously. A 
definition would thus be helpful to precisely convey the idea; Carrier Managed 
Transportation (CMT) will be defined below. The crucial factors that will affect 
the implementation of CMT will be discussed as well. 
 
Definition: Carrier Managed Transportation (CMT) is a coordinated relationship 




to the traditional approach, where the shipper or consignee decides when to 
request shipments of the products, in CMT, the carrier will make these decisions 
on their behalf through the sharing of information on the timing of planned 
replenishments. 
Table 1-1 gives a detailed comparison of VMI and CMT: 
Table 1-1: Comparison of VMI and CMT 
 VMI CMT 
Initiative in decision 
making 
Shifted from the buyer(s) to 
the vendor 
Shifted from the 
customer(s) to the carrier 
Order Quantity Decided by the vendor Specified by the 
customer(s) 
Timing Decided by the vendor, with 
consideration of 
requirements from the 
buyer(s) 
Decided by the carrier, with 
consideration of 




Decided by the vendor Decided by the carrier 





From the carrier’s perspective, better consolidation and greater chance of 
back-haul transportation can bring down his operating cost, while improving 
customer service quality. The shipper or consignee can save on the cost of 
issuing shipments, ask for flexibility in shipping/receiving, get advance shipping 




potential to lower the total cost of the whole supply chain, yet improve the 
performance and responsiveness at the same time. Meanwhile, CMT is aided by 
a long-term relationship between the chain members. This helps the supply chain 
to remain relatively stable and be easier to maintain. 
1.3 Key words on a transportation agreement 
To apply CMT in business, there are some key facts that we need to specify 
in a transportation contract. These include: roles and responsibilities of the 
companies involved, what type of transportation to use, etc. Below we explain 
two factors that will answer the previous questions. 
1.3.1 Private fleet or common carrier 
A “Private Fleet” is a set of vehicles operated by a company that offers 
transportation and distribution services, mostly for its own products. There are 
two points that will distinguish private fleet from a “Common Carrier”. One is 
that a common carrier offers services to the general public. Therefore, such a 
trucking firm has multiple clients compared to the few customers served by the 
private fleet. Another point is: For the common carrier, transportation or 
distribution is the core business of that firm; but for the company that operates a 
private fleet, usually this is not the case. Generally speaking, its private fleet can 






Incoterms (International Commercial terms) are a series of pre-defined 
commercial terms published by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). 
Because of the global acceptance, these terms are widely used in international 
commercial transactions. Nowadays, Incoterms are also used in domestic 
business with the intention to clearly communicate the tasks, costs and risks 
associated with the transportation and delivery of goods. 
In North America (especially the United States), FOB terms are often 
applied on land. However, they were originally designated for water 
transportation, meaning “Free On Board,” i.e. on the vessel. The FOB term 
indicates the point at which the ownership of the goods changes. 
Table 1-2 is a list of different FOB terms and their meanings. For illustrative 
purposes, we use the two typical terms, the first and the last one in Table 1-2, 
and name them FOB Origin and FOB Destination, respectively. 
Basically, FOB terms specify a physical point in the transportation path; 
ownership of the goods is assigned to one party on each side of that point. For 
FOB Origin, that point is the seller’s location: the buyer is responsible for the 
products, once they are ready to be transported from the seller’s site. Therefore, 
the buyer needs to deal with everything that is relevant to getting the goods to 
her site. Similarly, under FOB Destination, the seller is responsible for the 




Table 1-2: FOB terms 
Freight Terms Buyer Takes 





Choice of Carrier 
FOB Origin, Freight 
Collect 




Owns goods in transit 
Files claims for any 
loss, damage or 
overcharges 
 Buyer chooses carrier: either 
using buyer’s own fleet or 
common carrier 
FOB Origin, Freight 
Prepaid and Allowed 
At point of 
origin or 
factory 




Seller chooses carrier: either 
using seller’s own fleet or 
common carrier 
FOB Origin, Freight 
Prepaid and Added 




Owns goods in transit 
Adds freight to 
invoice 
Seller chooses carrier: either 




At destination Pays freight 
 
Owns goods in transit 
Files claims 
Buyer chooses carrier: either 
using buyer’s own fleet or 
common carrier 
FOB Destination, 
Freight Prepaid and 
Added 
At destination Pays freight Adds freight to 
invoice 
Owns goods in transit 
Seller chooses carrier: either 
using seller’s own fleet or 
common carrier 
FOB Destination, 
Freight Prepaid and 
Allowed 
At destination  Pays freight 
Owns goods in transit 
Files claims 
Seller chooses carrier: either 






1.4 Thesis outline 
In Chapter 1, we introduce the various logistics concepts, and define our 
research problem and research scope. This is followed by the notation that will 
be used in the models in later chapters. Literature and past works referred to are 
reviewed briefly in Chapter 1 as well. As there is no previous research on Carrier 
Managed Transportation, the review mainly contains papers with the topic of 
VMI or transportation. Articles concerning transportation cost configuration and 
consolidation methods are also cited. Then, in Chapters 2 and 3, each case 
introduced in Chapter 1 is categorized by the carriers, i.e. by the party 
responsible for performing the transportation or for choosing the carrier. Those 
cases are discussed in detail, and illustrated by numerical examples. Chapter 4 
contains the comprehensive numerical testing of the different parameters, and a 
comparison of the preceding cases. Several strong conclusions are drawn from 
the analysis. In the end, Chapter 5 summarizes all the work done in this thesis. 
For a new topic such as CMT, there are various choices for possible further 
research. Several suggestions on extending CMT and more complicated models 
are also provided in Chapter 5. 
1.5 Relevant literature 
Although Carrier Managed Transportation is a new concept, the theoretical 




findings under the topic of VMI are worth making use of for reference in our 
study of CMT.  
In the literature, Disney and Towill (2003) compared the expected 
performance of a VMI supply chain with a traditional “serially linked” supply 
chain, in terms of the impact on the “Bullwhip Effect”. They found that VMI is 
significantly better at responding to volatile changes in demand. 
Dong and Xu (2002) evaluated the short-term and long-term impact of VMI 
on supply chain profitability by analyzing the inventory systems of the parties 
involved. They found that in the short-term VMI can accomplish what full 
channel coordination is set to accomplish; in the long-run, VMI could more 
likely increase supplier’s profit than in the short-run when both the buyer and the 
supplier adjust their production, distribution and marketing efforts to take 
advantage of lower system-wide inventory-related cost. However, the authors 
did not distinguish VMI and consignment inventory (CI), although the two 
concepts are not identical. 
Based on a single vendor-buyer case, Gumus et al. (2008) analyzed the 
impact of inventory sourcing (IS), CI, and CI plus VMI, accounting for changes 
in certain cost parameters, and provided closed-form solutions indicating under 
which conditions a partnership is more favorable than others. Bookbinder et al. 
(2010) checked if VMI works or fails under independent decision making, VMI, 




the suppliers, as they “may combine routes from multiple origins, delay stock 
assignments, consolidate shipments to two or more customers, or postpone a 
decision on the quantity destined for each of them”. To study CMT, we apply a 
research methodology similar to that of Gumus et al. and Bookbinder et al. 
Çetinkaya and Lee (2000) considered a vendor realizing a sequence of 
random demands from a group of retailers located in a given geographical region, 
and presented an analytical model for coordinating inventory and transportation 
decisions in VMI systems, which can be viewed as a special case of CMT.      
To enjoy economies of scale in shipments, Cheung and Lee (2002) used 
information on the retailer’s inventory position to coordinate shipments from the 
supplier, and analyzed the drivers of the relative benefits to both parties. 
With the initiative of making shipment decisions, the carrier can take 
advantages of those economies of scale by improving the optimization of its 
distribution operations under CMT. Thus it is necessary to take into account 
previous work in the field of transportation and distribution. Some research 
considered transportation cost. Aucamp (1982) treated a modification of the 
standard EOQ problem in which total freight cost depends at least partially on 
the number of carloads required to fill the order. Burns et al. (1985) developed 
and evaluated an analytic method that aids in minimizing the sum of 
transportation and inventory costs for a supplier who distributes items to many 




examination of cost expressions relating to distribution activities and their 
relevance to actual costs. Kuzdrall (2002) explored lot size issues when a 
supplier’s prices include shipping charges that are not explicitly stated. The 
extended EOQ model is worth referring to and is applied in later chapters.  
There are several policies considering how the consolidation could be 
organized. Under a quantity policy, orders should be dispatched as soon as the 
consolidated weight available exceeds the designated level. If shipments are 
scheduled every constant cycle length, then this is a time policy.  A time-and-
quantity policy is the combination of the previous two policies, and the dispatch 
is triggered once one of the criteria reaches the predetermined point. Çetinkaya 
and Bookbinder (2003) obtained the optimal target weight before dispatch for a 
quantity policy, and the optimal maximum holding time of any order under a 
time policy, for both private carriage and common carriage. Bookbinder and 
Higginson (2002) employed probabilistic modeling to choose the maximum 
holding time and desired dispatch quantity for a time-and-quantity policy. The 
probability of accumulating the preceding target weight within a given time 
frame is also applicable in the analysis of CMT.  
Shippers and consignees may also benefit from CMT by requiring lead time 
reduction, an advance shipping notice, flexibility in receiving, and a quantity 
discount. Weng (1995) analyzed the impact of joint decision policies on channel 




buyers, in which both demand is price-sensitive and transaction costs are 
functions of order quantities. According to that author, quantity discounts in 
channel coordination aim to ensure that the joint order quantity selected by both 
the supplier and the buyer minimizes the joint operating costs; and the role of a 
“franchise fee” in channel coordination is to enforce the joint profit 
maximization for both the supplier and the buyer. 
Similar to in VMI, we can expect less information distortion, according to 
Lee et al. (1997) and Chen et al. (2000), in CMT as well. Although in this thesis, 
we do not stress the sharing of information between the parties, it is worth 
noticing that information sharing would also play an important part in the 
implementation of CMT. 
1.6 Problem definition and research scope 
1.6.1 Conceptual framework 
The FOB term used in the contract determines which party in the supply 
chain is responsible for transportation; either this party operates a private fleet 
(i.e. moves the goods in its own truck) or hires a common carrier. Distinct 
frameworks are needed to cover different contracts. Thus, our models can be 
roughly divided into two categories. To allow the chances for consolidation, we 




For the contract under FOB Destination, the seller is going to be the one in 
charge of transportation. Models of this category will contain one seller, two 
buyers, and a common carrier, if the seller chooses to hire one. A conceptual 
framework of the problem is depicted in Figure 1-2.  
The buyers are located in the same geographical region, and face their own 
constant, deterministic demands which are known in advance. They choose to 
manage their inventory through an EOQ model. Based on his demand rate, 
inventory holding cost, and ordering cost, each buyer establishes an economic 
order quantity and passes an order to the seller. The seller then replenishes the 











Figure 1-2: Model framework for FOB destination 
Time 
Region 


















We assume that the seller always has sufficient goods ready for release. This 
eliminates backorders to the buyers. The seller dispatches only one truck per 
shipment. Capacity of the truck is set to be large enough that there is no need to 
break orders into smaller loads. In addition, there is no extra stop on the way 
from the seller to the region where the buyers are. Therefore, given the distance 
between the seller and the region of buyers, we can obtain the in-transit time, as 
it is proportional to the line-haul distance. But we ignore any distances between 
the two buyers. In other words, delivery within a region is assumed to require 
minimal extra time. 
In industry, a usual way to guarantee that the buyer gets replenished on 
schedule, and not late, is by applying a time window. Here we introduce a time 
window (t, T), in which t is the point at which buyer places an order (e.g. 10AM 
on Tuesday); and T is the point when his inventory would hit zero, indicating the 
latest allowable arrival time of the replenishment (e.g. 4PM on Thursday). Time 
windows are established by buyers and passed to the seller. 
For the contract under FOB Origin, the buyer is the one in charge of 
transportation. Models of this category will contain one buyer, two sellers, and a 
common carrier, if the buyer chooses to hire one. A conceptual framework of 





The buyer faces constant, deterministic demands for two different products 
from his clients, and uses EOQ models to manage the inventory of those items. 
Based on demand rate, inventory holding cost, and ordering cost of each product, 
the buyer establishes an economic order quantity for it and passes an order to the 
corresponding seller. The sellers then prepare the goods according to the 
quantities required and timings agreed upon. Since the buyer is responsible for 
transportation, he picks up products at the sellers, which are located in the same 















Figure 1-3: Model framework for FOB destination, for products P and P′ 
Time 
Region 
















Similar to the previous contract, we assume that the sellers always have 
sufficient goods ready for release. The buyer uses only one truck per 
replenishment. Capacity of that vehicle is set to be large enough that there is no 
need to break orders into smaller loads. In addition, there is no extra stop on the 
way from the buyer to the region where the sellers are located. Therefore, given 
the distance between the buyer and the region of the sellers, we again calculate 
the time in transit, proportional to that distance. As before, travelling within a 
region is assumed to require minimal extra time, hence we ignore any distances 
between the two sellers. 
The definition of time window is basically the same as stated above. A 
subtle difference is that the time windows here are generated by the one buyer, 
but for different products. 
1.6.2 Research Scope 
To clearly indentify the pros and cons of CMT, we introduce another 
distribution policy for comparison. That is “independent decision making”, 
which is the traditional way of doing business between the carrier and 
shipper/consignee. When there is no coordination between the parties, the 
shipper, carrier and consignee each act separately. The shipper or consignee 
makes distribution decisions on the premise of minimizing her total cost. She 




decisions are passed to the logistics department of the given firm or to the 
common carrier. In either case, the latter will make decisions on distribution 
practices to minimize his total cost, based on requirements from the 
shipper/consignee.  
Unlike independent decision making, under CMT, the carrier establishes and 
manages the distribution decisions on behalf of the shipper or consignee, through 
the sharing of information on the timing and quantities of planned dispatches or 
replenishments. The carrier merges those decisions with his own transportation 
operations, i.e. through consolidation of shipments. The shipper or consignee is 
exempt from related expenses by giving up some rights in decision making, e.g. 
chances to get a lower total cost on their own. 
The parties involved in the partnership are governed by a CMT contract. 
Although that contract covers all those parties, the essence of it is between two 
specific parties under various settings. We will discuss it later in Chapters 2 and 
3.  
Our aim is to develop and analyze quantitative cost models under 
independent decision making and CMT, as well as to measure the savings on 
total cost of the seller(s), buyer(s), common carrier, and the whole supply chain. 
The following cost factors will be included in our models: the costs of on-site 
inventory holding, those of pipeline inventory, transportation, shipment dispatch, 




relates to writing up the dispatch request and determining the time of shipment. 
Note that the buyer is responsible for on-site inventory holding costs and the cost 
of receiving goods; the seller is responsible for on-site inventory holding costs 
there, and for the cost of order preparation. The remainder of the above costs 
may be incurred by different parties, depending on the distribution policy applied.  
1.7 Introduction to the cases 
Table 1-3 would contain eight cases if we simply combined the carrier 
choices and FOB terms. However, due to lack of practicality, half the 
combinations are not used in industry. For example, if the buyer owns private 
transportation, she will tend to pick up the products herself instead of entrusting 
the seller. Hence, she will sign a contract featuring FOB origin in this situation. 
The reasoning is similar when the buyer has the advantage of hiring common 
carriage.  
Now consider the seller’s perspective. If he is to organize the transportation, 
he will avoid the usage of FOB origin because, under FOB origin, expenses on 
transportation will be paid by the buyer. No matter whether the seller chose to 
use private or common carriage, he would need to add an additional charge to 
the invoice for the products shipped. His cost structure would thus be exposed to 




As a result, there are only four cases left (Table 1-3): Private fleet belongs to 
the seller, FOB destination (Case 1); Private fleet belongs to the buyer, FOB 
origin (Case 2); Common carrier, FOB destination (Case 3); and Common 
carrier, FOB origin (Case 4).  






 Common carrier 
hired by 
Seller Buyer  Seller Buyer 
FOB 
terms 
Destination Case 1 ×  Case 3 × 
Origin × Case 2  × Case 4 
*The symbol × indicates situations that do not occur in industry 
We will introduce the four cases one by one, following the sequence above. 
Costs will be assigned to the seller and buyer under both distribution policies, 
while focusing on the contractual relationship under CMT. That relationship may 
involve the carrier, and even an additional buyer or seller, depending upon the 
case. We will discuss those cases, based on the type of carriage, in Chapters 2 
and 3, respectively. 
1.8 Notation 
A simple mathematical model will be used to illustrate the changes in cost 
of each party and of the whole supply chain, with and without CMT. We now 





Table 1-4: Notation 
Symbol Meaning 
ac Fixed cost of shipment dispatch ($) 
as Seller’s cost of order preparation ($ per shipment) 
ab Buyer’s cost of receiving goods ($ per shipment) 
hs Cost to hold a unit in inventory at the seller ($ per day) 
hb Cost to hold a unit in inventory at the buyer ($ per day) 
hp Cost to carry a unit in inventory in-transit ($ per day) 
K Carrier’s cost of initiating a dispatch ($ per shipment) 
δ Transportation cost ($ per unit distance) 
Q Quantity ordered by the buyer (units per shipment) 
tp In-transit time (day) 
D Distance between the seller and the buyer 
  
Table 1-4 lists the complete set of notation. With those symbols, the cost of 
each party is clearly expressed. But it will be demonstrated in later chapters that 
some parameters have no impact on the results in which we are interested. We 
begin in Chapter 2 by using this notation to build our models and analyze the 





Chapter 2 Private Fleet 
In this chapter we discuss the two cases with only two parties involved. 
Either the seller or the buyer operates a private fleet to fulfill the transportation 
needs. Two distribution policies are considered: Independent decision making 
(IDM) and CMT. We build models to analyze the cost structure of each party 
under both policies. By calculating the savings on the total cost of each party and 
the whole supply chain, we verify the potential benefits of CMT using private 
fleet, as introduced in Chapter 1. Some numerical examples are applied to 
illustrate the significance of the savings. At the end of this chapter, we perform a 
comparison between the two cases. 
We use the subscripts s and b to refer to seller and buyer. In addition, 
subscripts 1 and 2, used both for variable parameters and total costs, denote 
independent decision making and CMT, respectively. 
2.1 Private fleet belongs to the seller, FOB destination (Case 1) 
Responsibility of the seller is determined by FOB destination. The seller 
operates a private fleet to fulfill his duty of shipping the products. Ownership of 
the products is transferred to the buyer when the seller’s truck arrives at the 





In Case 1, the carrier and the shipper are actually one entity – the seller, and 
the consignee is the buyer. We apply the framework of the first model in Section 





In order to distinguish the two buyers, they will be denoted as subscripts      
b and b′, respectively. In addition, their time windows vary, with a difference of 
Δt (i.e. T ′ – T = t1′ – t1 = Δt). See Figure 2-2 for the details about time windows 
under both distribution policies). For independent decision making, the time 
windows produced by the buyers according to EOQ models are very stringent. 
The buyer orders at t1 (or t1′), and expects to receive the goods at T (or T ′). Thus, 
T – t1 = T ′ – t1′ = tp (in-transit time), and the consolidation option is not possible. 
Under CMT, both buyers are willing to extend their time windows. Each of 
them also agrees that replenishment can arrive at any time between the intervals, 
(t2, T) or (t2′, T ′). The seller can take advantage of the extended time window and 
wait for additional new orders, instead of replenish the buyer immediately when 
her order comes. However, the seller still needs to send his truck no later than t1. 
Both time windows contain the time interval [t2′, t1], indicating that 
consolidation is feasible. 
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In more detail, Figure 2-2: Time window in Case 1 indicates that the time t1′ 
could be extended to t2′, and the time t1 could be as early as t2. With either or 
both of these changes, it would still be possible to consolidate the shipments to B 
and B′. 
Now we divide the costs under independent decision making and CMT, 
respectively. 
Carrier managed transportation 
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2.1.1 Independent decision making 
Under independent decision making, the seller/buyer acts on his/her own. 
The buyer places an order, passes it to the seller. The seller prepares the goods 
and sends them to the buyer on the delivery day agreed upon. 
Costs of the seller = the costs of (1) Order preparation + (2) On-site 
inventory holding + (3) Pipeline + (4) Shipment dispatch + (5) Transportation 
Cost for the buyer = (6) On-site inventory holding + (7) Receiving 
Among all costs, (1) and (2) are bound to the seller, and (6) and (7) are tied 
up with the buyer, as indicated in Section 1.6.2. The seller is responsible for (3) 
and (5) because of FOB destination. (4) is generated by the customer service 
department of the seller, and (5) is the operation cost of his logistics department. 
Generally, pipeline cost is a part of inventory cost. However, based on 
different cases, the on-site inventory holding cost and pipeline cost may be 
generated by different parties. Thus, we split pipeline cost and on-site inventory 
holding cost. 
We assume that inventory holding cost starts to apply after t1 for the seller 
and buyer b, and after t1′ for the seller and buyer b′. This also applies in the 
following sections and Chapter 3. Although we do not consider the inventory 
holding costs before t1 and t1′, those costs still exist, but will be cancelled out in 





Let us rewrite the above equations by the notation in Section 1.8. 
TCs1 = as(Q + Q′) + hp(Q + Q′)tp + 2ac + 2(K + δD) 
                  (1)                 (3)            (4)          (5) 
TCb1= ab                          TCb′1= ab′ 
(7)                                    (7) 
Below each term, we have indicated the number that corresponds to the 
verbal description of that cost. Note that not every term (1) – (7) will appear in a 
particular case. 
The cost of the whole supply chain is the summation of the above costs. 
TC1 = as(Q + Q′) + hp(Q + Q′)tp + 2ac + 2(K + δD) + ab + ab′ 
Note that, throughout this thesis, Q and Q′ are given parameters, not decision 
variables. We will come back to this point in Section 4.3. 
2.1.2 CMT 
CMT in Case 1 enables the seller to make shipment decisions on behalf of 
the buyer, given the buyer’s time window. Usually, the buyer is willing to extend 
her time window if the seller provides an Advance Shipping Notice (ASN). The 
seller can take advantage of the extended time window to better perform his 
distribution operations. 
Cost of the seller = those due to (1) Order preparation + (2) On-site 
inventory holding + (3) Pipeline + (4) Shipment dispatch + (5) Transportation 




It seems that the costs of each party do not vary between independent 
decision making and CMT. However, now under CMT, the cost (4) shifts from 
the shipper’s customer service department, to the firm’s logistics department, 
which is the carrier. Remember that, in this case the seller is both the shipper and 
consignee. This shift happens because CMT allows the carrier to establish and 
manage the distribution decisions on behalf of the shipper; the latter is thus 
exempt from related expenses. 
The seller can dispatch the truck during the interval between t2′ and t1. 
Assume that the seller chooses to dispatch at t, t ∈ [t2′, t1.]. Compared to 
independent decision making, the seller replenishes the buyer b prior to t1 and 
the buyer b′ prior to t1+Δt. The extra inventory holding cost (based on t1 and t1′) 
is – (t1 – t)Qhs – (t1 + Δt – t)Q′hs. 
TCs2 = as(Q + Q′) – (t1 – t)Qhs – (t1 + Δt – t)Q′hs + hp(Q + Q′)tp + ac + K +  δD 
                  (1)                            (2)                                 (3)           (4)       (5) 
TCb2= (t1 – t)Qhb + ab                     TCb′2= (t1 + Δt – t)Q′hb′ + ab′ 
                 (6)         (7)                                         (6)                (7) 
Recall, from the definition of t, that (t1 – t) ≥ 0. 
The cost of the whole supply chain is thus 
TC2= as(Q + Q′) + (t1 – t)Q(hb– hs) + (t1 + Δt – t) Q′(hb′– hs) + hp(Q + Q′)tp + 
ac +  K + δD + ab + ab′ 
The actual focus of the contractual relationship under FOB destination 




previous relationship becomes less interesting. Hence, we focus on the 
relationship between seller and buyer. However, we can still use CMT to 
enhance the coordination between two different departments of the seller. 
2.1.3 Effects of CMT 
Comparing the cost functions in Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, we get the 
following results: 
TCs1 – TCs2 = (t1 – t)Qhs + (t1 + Δt – t)Q′hs + ac + K + δD > 0 
The seller saves money mainly from consolidation, and saves a small part on 
inventory holding. 
TCb1 – TCb2  =  – (t1 – t)Qhb  ≤  0   
and  TCb′1– TCb′2  =  – (t1 + Δt – t)Q′hb′  ≤  0, since  (t1 – t) ≥ 0. 
The buyers need to pay extra inventory holding cost, as the goods arrive in 
advance. 
TC1 – TC2 = (t1 – t)Q(hs– hb) + (t1 + Δt – t)Q′(hs – hb′) + ac + K + δD 
If the buyer spends less money than the seller in storing the products, the 
savings of the whole supply chain is even bigger.  
From a system-wide perspective, CMT reduces the cost of the supply chain, 
and shifts part of the seller’s inventory holding cost to the buyers, especially the 
one with the latest arrival time T′. The greater opportunity for consolidation is 




In order to compensate the buyers, the seller can share part of his interest in 
the form of price discount. That is, he can lower the price by a certain percentage 
of the original price.  
If hb < hs and hb′ < hs, then to some extent, CMT reduced the seller’s cost 
on inventory, as originally, he has to pay (t1 – t)Qhs + (t1 + Δt – t)Q′hs. However 
for now, even though he has to compensate the buyer, he only needs to pay (t1 – 
t)Qhb + (t1 + Δt – t)Q′ hb′.  
2.1.4 Numerical example 
We assign the following initial values to the base case parameters involved: 
Fixed cost of issuing a shipment, ac = $10 /order 
Buyer’s cost of receiving the products, ab = $20 /order 
Transportation cost, δ = $2 /mile 
Annual cost to hold a unit in inventory at the seller, hs = $1.2 /unit/year 
Annual cost to hold a unit in inventory at the buyer, hb = $1.5 /unit/year 
Carrier’s cost of initiating a dispatch, K = $15 /dispatch 
Distance between region of seller(s) and region of buyer(s), D = 200 miles 
Quantity ordered by the buyer, Q = 100 units 
Difference of order time, Δt = 2 days 
Other than the parameters listed before, in Case 1, there are three more 




Quantity ordered by the other buyer Q′ = 80 units 
Annual cost to hold a unit in inventory at buyer b′, hb′ = $1.8 /unit/year  
Original difference between the order time of buyer b (under independent 
decision making) and order time of buyer b′ (under CMT), t1- t =3 days. 
 
Let Δt vary between values of 0 and 7, in steps of 1. The trend of the four 
cost savings is shown below. 
 
Figure 2-3: Case 1 - Cost savings from CMT with the variation of Δt 
Figure 2-3 provides an overview of the cost distribution among all three 
parties, The savings of the seller is at the same height with the savings of the 
supply chain, while the buyers are around zero cost saving. Although the value 
of Δt slightly changed the cost savings, the impact is negligible. 
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(1) Most of the savings of the whole supply chain come from savings of the 
seller, i.e. the owner of the truck. 
(2) Fixed cost of issuing a shipment, ac; transportation cost, δ; carrier’s cost 
of initiating a dispatch, K; distance between the region of seller and the region of 
buyers, D; and order quantities of both buyers have greater impact on the savings. 
Changes of the rest of the parameters may slightly vary the savings for parties, 
thus are trivial.  
(3) The mathematical expressions of the buyers’ savings are negative, 
indicating that the buyers are actually losing money under CMT. However, the 
numerical examples show that their loss is not significant. When they order 
about 100 units, the maximum amount of loss is $5. Even if they order up to 
1000 units, their loss will be no greater than $20. In real life, buyers will not 
refuse to get involved in CMT because of such tiny loss. A buyer benefits from 
CMT through the Advance Shipping Notice (ASN) and a more stable 
relationship with the seller. 
2.2 Private fleet belongs to the buyer, FOB origin (Case 2) 
Responsibility of the buyer is determined by FOB origin. The buyer 
operates a private fleet to fulfill her duty of picking up the products. Ownership 




buyer’s truck at the seller’s location. Thus, it is the buyer that bears the pipeline 
inventory holding cost. 
In Case 2, the carrier and the consignee are actually one entity – the buyer, 
and the shipper is the seller. We apply the second model framework in Section 





In order to distinguish the two sellers, we refer to them as s and s′. The 
buyer buys two products P and P′, respectively from s and s′, with a difference of 
Δt (i.e. T ′ – T = t1′ – t1 = Δt) in the order timing. See Figure 2-5 for the details 
about time windows under both distribution policies. For independent decision 
making, the time windows of the two products are very stringent, according to 
the EOQ model with lead time. The buyer orders at t1 (or t1′), and expects to get 
replenished at T (or T ′). Thus, T – t1 = T ′ – t1′ = tp (in-transit time); consolidation 
is not possible. 
Under CMT, the sellers are willing to coordinate their production cycles 
with the buyer. As a result, the buyer can extend her time windows for both 
products, and also allows replenishment to arrive at any time during the new 
interval between t2 (or t2′) and the scheduled arrival time T (or T ′). She can 
Figure 2-4: Parties involved in Case 2 
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combine the pickup process of the two products into one. It is necessary to make 
sure that a truck is sent to pick up the products no later than t1. Both time 















Now we divide the costs under independent decision making and CMT, 
respectively. 
Carrier managed transportation 
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2.2.1 Independent decision making 
Under independent decision making, the seller/buyer acts on his/her own. 
The buyer places an order, passes it to the seller. The seller prepares the goods 
and notifies the buyer to pick them up on the day specified by him. 
Cost of the seller = (1) Order preparation + (2) On-site inventory holding 
Cost of the buyer = (3) Pipeline + (4) Shipment dispatch + (5) 
Transportation + (6) On-site inventory holding + (7) Receiving 
The buyer is responsible for (3) and (5) because of FOB origin. (4) is 
generated by the purchasing department of the buyer, and (5) is the operation 
cost of her distribution/logistics department. 
Rewriting the above equations by the notation in Section 1.8, we have 
TCs1 = asQ; TCs′1= as′Q′; and TCb1= hp(Q + Q′)tp + 2ac + 2(K + δD) + 2ab 
            (1)                (1)                            (3)            (4)          (5)           (6) 
The cost of the whole supply chain is then 
TC1 = asQ + as′Q′+ hp(Q + Q′)tp + 2ac + 2(K + δD) + 2ab 
2.2.2 CMT 
With or without CMT, the buyer is flexible to extend her own time windows. 
However, she may get the seller to extend the time limit on picking up the goods 
(e.g. from one day to three days) under CMT. The buyer can then take the 
chance to conduct consolidations. 




Cost of the buyer = (3) Pipeline + (4) Shipment dispatch + (5) 
Transportation + (6) On-site inventory holding + (7) Receiving 
It seems that there is no variation in the costs of either party. However, the 
cost (4) actually shifts from the purchasing department, which functions as the 
consignee, to the logistics department, which is the carrier. It happens because 
CMT allows the carrier to establish and manage the distribution decisions on 
behalf of the consignee; the latter is thus exempt from related expenses. 
Under CMT, the buyer tends to combine the pickup of two products together 
into one truck. That is, when she places an order for P at t1, she also places an 
order for P′. 
TCs2 = asQ            TCs′2= as′Q′ – hs′Q′Δt 
            (1)                         (1)          (2) 
TCb2= hp(Q + Q′)tp + ac + K + δD + hbQ′Δt + ab 
                  (3)            (4)        (5)           (6)       (7) 
The cost of the whole supply chain is: 
TC2 = asQ + as′Q′ + (hb – hs′)Q′Δt + hp(Q + Q′)tp + ac + K + δD + ab 
The actual focus of the contractual relationship under FOB origin should be 
between consignee and carrier. As the buyer plays both roles now, the previous 
relationship becomes less interesting. However, we can still use CMT to enhance 
the coordination between two different departments of the buyer. Note that the 




2.2.3 Effects of CMT 
Comparing the cost functions in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, we get the 
following results: TCs1 – TCs2 = 0; TCs′1– TCs′2 = hs′Q′Δt 
It seems that the sellers are no worse off. However, since the seller does not 
have a clear expectation on when the buyer will come, he needs to prepare the 
products beforehand. This may cause inconvenience to the seller. 
TCb1 – TCb2 = ac + K + δD – hbQ′Δt + ab 
The buyer’s motivation of using CMT is to reduce her total cost, so the 
previous difference must be greater than 0. Based on the parameters, we can get 
a range of Δt. This helps the buyer decide whether to combine P′ into the 
consolidation process. Thus, we have: 
Δt < (K + δD + ab + ac)/ hbQ′ 
This equation implies that: 
If the sellers are far away, the buyer can wait for a longer time to perform 
consolidation; and if the quantity she needs to purchase is large, it is better to 
consider the sellers with the smaller time difference first. 
TC1 – TC2 = ac + K + δD + ab + (hs′ – hb)Q′Δt 
From system-wide perspective, CMT reduced the cost of the supply chain, 
and shifted part of the sellers’ inventory holding cost to the buyer. The increment 




2.2.4 Numerical example 
Other than the parameters listed in Section 2.1.4, in Case 2, there are two 
more parameters to be added, and their initial values are as follow: 
Quantity ordered by the buyer for product P′, Q′ = 80 units 
Annual cost to hold a unit in inventory at the seller s′, hs′ = $1.8 /unit/year 
 
Again we observe the trend of the four cost savings when Δt varies between 
values of 0 and 7, in steps of 1. 
 
Figure 2-6: Case 2 - Cost savings from CMT with the variation of Δt 
The cost saving distribution among all parties looks similar to that in Figure 
2-3 . However, in Case 2, it is the buyer that takes most of the savings, and the 
two sellers have about zero cost savings. Again, the changes in Δt has little effect 
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More numerical examples can be found in Appendix A, the part for Case 2. 
All these results show that: 
(1) Most of the savings of the whole supply chain now come from savings 
of the buyer, the owner of the truck in this case. 
(2) Fixed cost of receiving the products, ab, along with δ, K, D, and ac have 
greater impact on the savings. Changes of the rest of the parameters may slightly 
vary the savings for parties, thus are trivial. 
(3) It is worth noticing that quantity ordered by the buyer for product P′, Q′, 
has less impact on savings of the relevant party and the whole supply chain than 
it has in Case 1. 
Combine the findings in Sections 2.1.4 and 2.2.4, we can get a strong result: 
Whoever owns the truck gets most of the savings. And those savings in turn, 
result from having consolidated shipments. 
Another fact worth noticing is that CMT always transfer inventory holding 
cost of the seller to the buyer. This seems to be contrary to JIT (Just-in-time), 
under which the inventory holding cost is shifted to the seller, and ideally, the 
buyer can achieve zero inventory. 
In the next chapter we will continue the exploration of Carrier Managed 




Chapter 3 Common Carrier 
In this chapter we discuss the two cases with three parties involved. Either 
the seller or the buyer hires a common carrier to fulfill the transportation needs. 
The distribution policies, research methodologies and sequences of discussion 
are the same as in Chapter 2. We start from the case of FOB destination. 
We use the subscripts s, b, and c to refer to seller, buyer and common carrier. 
Subscripts 1 and 2, used both for parameters and total costs, denote independent 
decision making and CMT, respectively. 
3.1 Common carrier, FOB destination (Case 3) 
Responsibility of the seller is determined by FOB destination. The seller 
hires a common carrier to fulfill his duty of shipping the products. Ownership of 
the products is transferred to the buyer when the common carrier’s truck arrives 
at the buyer’s location. Thus, it is the seller that bears the pipeline inventory 
holding cost. The common carrier has no ownership of the goods in the whole 
process. 
Compared to the cases of private fleet, one more party is engaged in Case 3, 
making the contract more complicated, as each of the parties needs to deal with 
the other two. We apply the framework of the first model in Section 1.6.1. The 










We continue to use the subscripts and time windows (see Figure 2-2) of the 
two buyers in Section 2.1 for the two buyers in Case 3. Notice that when using 
common carrier under independent decision making, the lead time will be longer 
since the information interchange between seller and carrier will take some time. 
That is, the tp under common carrier is longer than it is in 0. 
Now we divide the costs under independent decision making and CMT, 
respectively. 
3.1.1 Independent decision making 
Under independent decision making, each party acts on his own. The buyer 
places an order, passes it to the seller. The seller prepares the goods and requires 
the common carrier to pick them up and send them to the buyer on the delivery 
day agreed upon. 
Costs of the seller = the cost of (1) Order preparation + (2) On-site inventory 
holding + (3) Pipeline + (4) Shipment dispatch 
Cost for the buyer = (6) On-site inventory holding + (7) Receiving 
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Cost of the common carrier = (5) Transportation 
Among all costs, (1) and (2) are bound to the seller, and (6) and (7) are tied 
up with the buyer, as indicated in Section 1.6.2. The seller is responsible for (3) 
because of FOB destination. (4) is generated by the customer service department 
of the seller. Now (5) is the operation cost of the common carrier. 
Let us rewrite the above equations by the notation in Section 1.8. 
TCs1 = as(Q + Q′) + hp(Q + Q′)tp + 2ac 
                  (1)                 (3)            (4) 
TCb1= ab    TCb′1= ab′    TCc1 = 2(K + δD) 
           (7)              (7)                     (5) 
The cost of the whole supply chain is then 
TC1 = as(Q + Q′) + hp(Q + Q′)tp + 2ac + ab + ab′ + 2(K + δD) 
3.1.2 CMT 
CMT in Case 3 enables the carrier to make shipment decisions on behalf of 
the seller, through sharing the buyer’s time window. Usually, the buyer is willing 
to extend her time window if the seller and common carrier provide an Advance 
Shipping Notice (ASN). The common carrier can take advantage of the extended 
time window to better perform distribution operations. 
Costs of the seller = those due to (1) Order preparation + (2) On-site 
inventory holding + (3) Pipeline 




Cost of the common carrier = (4) Shipment dispatch + (5) Transportation 
As we can see, (4) shifts from the seller to the common carrier. It happens 
because CMT allows the carrier to establish and manage the distribution 
decisions on behalf of the shipper; the latter is thus exempt from related 
expenses. 
The common carrier can dispatch the truck during the interval between t2′ 
and t1. Assume the common carrier chooses to dispatch at time t ∈ [t2′, t1.]. 
Compared to independent decision making, the buyer b gets replenished prior to 
t1, and the buyer b′ gets replenished prior to t1+Δt. There is thus a saving in 
inventory holding cost (relative to independent decision making) of (t1 – t)Qhs + 
(t1 + Δt – t)Q′hs. 
TCs2 = as(Q + Q′) – (t1 – t)Qhs – (t1 + Δt – t)Q′hs + hp(Q + Q′)tp 
                  (1)                            (2)                                 (3) 
TCb2= (t1 – t)Qhb + ab;   TCb′2= (t1 + Δt – t)Q′hb′ + ab′;   TCc2 = ac + K + δD 
                  (6)         (7)                        (6)               (7)               (4)        (5) 
The cost of the whole supply chain is: 
TC2= as(Q + Q′) + (t1 – t)Q(hb– hs) + (t1 + Δt – t) Q′(hb′– hs) + hp(Q + Q′)tp + 
ac + K + δD + ab + ab′ 
The focus of the contractual relationship in Case 3 is between shipper and 
carrier. However, although the common carrier is more involved in the business 




3.1.3 Effects of CMT 
Comparing the cost functions in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, we get the 
following results: 
TCs1 – TCs2 = (t1 – t)Qhs + (t1 + Δt – t)Q′hs + 2ac > 0 
The seller does not need to pay a shipment-issuing fee under CMT, and 
saves a small part on inventory holding. 
TCb1 – TCb2 = – (t1 – t)Qhb ≤ 0 
TCb′1– TCb′2 = – (t1 + Δt – t)Q′hb′ ≤ 0 
The buyers need to pay extra inventory holding cost, as the goods arrive in 
advance. 
TCc1 – TCc2 = K + δD – ac 
Although the carrier has to pay the shipment-issuing fee, the majority of his 
savings are from consolidation. 
TC1 – TC2 = (t1 – t)Q(hs– hb) + (t1 + Δt – t) Q′(hs – hb′) + ac + K + δD 
From a system-wide perspective, CMT with a common carrier involved will 
not make much difference compared to private fleet. However, under CMT, the 
information sharing between carrier and seller enhances the dispatching process; 
hence this reduces the replenishment lead time. Meanwhile, the carrier has more 
flexibility in timing than the seller and buyer, and he does not bear any inventory 




to the buyers as early as possible. Thus, the buyer might be willing to provide a 
wider time window to the common carrier. 
3.1.4 Numerical example 
We assign the following initial values to the base case parameters involved: 
Fixed cost of issuing a shipment, ac = $10 /order 
Buyer’s cost of receiving the products, ab = $20 /order 
Transportation cost, δ = $2 /mile 
Annual cost to hold a unit in inventory at the seller, hs = $5 /unit/year 
Annual cost to hold a unit in inventory at the buyer, hb = $5 /unit/year 
Carrier’s cost of initiating a dispatch, K = $15 /dispatch 
Distance between region of seller(s) and region of buyer(s), D = 200 miles 
Quantity ordered by the buyer, Q = 100 units 
Difference of order time, Δt = 2 days 
Before we start numerical testing, we need to assign initial values to three 
extra parameters for Case 3: 
Quantity ordered by the other buyer Q′ = 80 units 
Annual cost to hold a unit in inventory at buyer b′, hb′ = $5 /unit/year 
Original difference between the order time of buyer b (under independent 





The differences in each total cost as a function of Δt is in the following 
figure. Δt varies between values of 0 and 7, in steps of 1. 
 
Figure 3-2: Case 3 - Cost savings from CMT with the variation of Δt 
From Figure 3-2 we can see that the carrier shares most of the savings of the 
supply chain. The seller takes a small portion. It seems there is no remarkable 
change in all cost savings when Δt takes different values. Similar to in Case 1, 
the buyers are around zero cost saving.  
More examples are in Appendix B. All these examples show that: 
(1) Most of the savings of the whole supply chain come from savings of the 
carrier. The rest of the savings is from the seller. 
(2) Similar to Case 1, ac, δ, K and D have greater impact on the savings, 
while impacts of the remaining parameters are trivial. It is worth noticing that ac 








0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Δt









carrier, the effect of ac is negative. In addition, if the buyer orders more, the 
seller can save more on his total cost. 
(3) The mathematical expressions indicates that the buyers may not like to 
get involved in CMT, as their savings are negative, especially with the increment 
in order quantity. However, the numerical examples show that their loss is not 
significant. When they order about 100 units, the maximum amount of loss is 
almost zero. Even if they order up to 1000 units, their loss will be no greater than 
$50. The carrier can compensate the buyers for their loss by sharing some of the 
savings and providing better service. It is in the carrier’s best interest to have 
stable, long-term relationships. 
3.2 Common carrier, FOB origin (Case 4) 
Responsibility of the buyer is determined by FOB origin. The buyer hires a 
common carrier to fulfill her duty of picking up the products. Ownership of the 
products is transferred to the buyer when the goods are loaded on the common 
carrier’s truck at the seller’s location. Recall that there are two sellers, S and S′. 
Thus, it is the buyer that bears the pipeline inventory holding cost. Same as in 
Case 3, the common carrier has no propriety of the goods in the whole process. 
In Case 4, as in case 3, the CMT contract involves an additional party 




with the other two, the situation becomes more complicated. We apply the 





























Figure 3-3: Parties involved in Case 4 
Carrier managed transportation 




t1 T t1′ T ′ 








The subscripts and time windows of the two sellers are almost the same as 
defined in Section 2.2. However, there is a slight difference. That is, t2 = t2′ = t1 
no longer holds, due to the fact that transportation is performed by the common 
carrier. The common carrier can combine orders according to his own 
convenience, as long as he is sure that the buyer gets replenished before T. 
Now we divide the costs under independent decision making and CMT, 
respectively. 
3.2.1 Independent decision making 
Under independent decision making, each party acts on his own. The buyer 
places an order, passes it to the seller. The seller prepares the goods and notifies 
the buyer. The buyer then requires the common carrier to pick them up on the 
day specified by the seller. 
Cost of the seller = (1) Order preparation + (2) On-site inventory holding 
Cost of the buyer = (3) Pipeline + (4) Shipment dispatch + (6) On-site 
inventory holding + (7) Receiving 
Cost of the common carrier = (5) Transportation 
The buyer is responsible for (3) because of FOB origin. (4) is generated by 
the purchasing department of the buyer. As in Section 3.1.1, (5) is the operation 
cost of the common carrier. 




TCs1 = asQ;  TCs′1= as′Q′;  TCb1= hp(Q + Q′)tp + 2ac + 2ab; TCc1 = 2(K + δD) 
            (1)                 (1)                       (3)            (4)     (7)                   (5) 
The cost of the whole supply chain is: 
TC1 = asQ + as′Q′ + hp(Q + Q′)tp + 2ac + 2ab + 2(K + δD) 
3.2.2 CMT 
CMT in Case 4 enables the carrier to make shipment replenishment 
decisions on behalf of the buyer. With or without CMT, the buyer is flexible to 
extend her own time windows. However, the common carrier also needs to get 
the seller’s permission to extend the time limit on picking up the goods. The 
common carrier can take the chance to conduct consolidations, but still must 
respect the buyer’s time window. 
Cost of the seller = (1) Order preparation + (2) On-site inventory holding 
Cost of the buyer = (3) Pipeline + (6) On-site inventory holding + (7) 
Receiving 
Cost of the common carrier = (4) Shipment dispatch + (5) Transportation 
As we can see, (4) shifts from the buyer to the common carrier. It happens 
because CMT allows the carrier to establish and manage the distribution 
decisions on behalf of the consignee; the latter is thus exempt from related 
expenses. 
The common carrier can dispatch the truck between the points in time t2′ and 




Compared to independent decision making, the buyer would receive both 
products P and P′ before the latest arrival time points T and T ′. The buyer’s extra 
inventory holding cost (based on t1 and t1′) is (t1 – t)Qhb + (t1 + Δt – t)Q′hb. 
TCs2 = asQ – (t1 – t)Qhs  TCs′2= as′Q′– (t1 + Δt – t)Q′hs′ 
            (1)         (2)                      (1)              (2) 
TCb2= hp(Q + Q′)tp + (t1 – t)Qhb + (t1 + Δt – t)Q′hb + ab 
                   (3)                              (6)                         (7) 
TCc2 = ac + K + δD 
           (4)       (5) 
Thus, the cost of the whole supply chain is: 
TC2 = asQ + as′Q′ + (t1 – t)Q(hb– hs) + (t1 + Δt – t) Q′(hb– hs′) + hp(Q + Q′)tp 
+ ac + ab + K + δD 
The focus of the contractual relationship in Case 4 is between consignee and 
carrier. However, although the common carrier is more involved in the business 
with the buyer, it cannot avoid the interactions with the seller. 
3.2.3 Effects of CMT 
Comparing the cost functions in Section 3.2.1 and Section 3.2.2, we get the 
following results: 
TCs1 – TCs2 = (t1 – t)Qhs ≥ 0 
TCs′1– TCs′2 = (t1 + Δt – t)Q′hs′ > 0 
It seems that the sellers are no worse off. Although neither seller knows 




given time interval. The products will have to be prepared before that. This is 
only a minor inconvenience. 
TCb1 – TCb2 = 2ac – (t1 – t)Qhb – (t1 + Δt – t)Q′hb + ab 
The buyer can save on the receiving cost and shipment-issuing cost, but may 
have to bear more inventory holding cost. 
TCc1 – TCc2 = K + δD – ac 
Although the carrier has to pay the shipment-issuing fee, he saved majority 
from consolidation. 
TC1 – TC2 = ac + ab + K + δD + (t1 – t)Q(hs– hb) + (t1 + Δt – t) Q′(hs′– hb) 
The system wide cost is the same as when the private fleet belongs to the 
buyer, FOB origin. However, the sellers have a disutility of not knowing when 
the common carrier will arrive. Hence, the products might be sorted and 
prepared several days before the truck arrives, although it is sometimes 
unnecessary. 
3.2.4 Numerical example 
We continue to use the base values in Section 3.1.4, but with two more 
parameters added for Case 4: 
Quantity ordered by the buyer for product P′, Q′ = 80 units 





The cost savings will be like in Figure 3-5 if Δt varies between values of 0 
and 7, in steps of 1. 
 
Figure 3-5: Case 4 - Cost savings from CMT with the variation of Δt 
Again the carrier shares most of the savings of the supply chain. This time, 
the buyer gets the rest. There is a trend that savings of the buyer tends to 
decrease when Δt grows bigger, but the effect is still minor. Similar to in Case 2, 
the sellers are around zero cost saving. 
The numerical examples in Appendix B for Case 4 illustrate that: 
(1) Same as in Case 3, most of the savings of the whole supply chain comes 
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(2) Parameters related to shipping and receiving and the transportation cost 
have greater impact on the savings. Changes to the rest of the parameters may 
slightly vary the savings for parties, thus are trivial. 
(3) In Case 4, quantity ordered by the buyer for product P, Q, has more 
impact on savings of the relevant party and the whole supply chain, comparing to 
Case 2. 
The findings in Sections 3.1.4 and 3.2.4 still supports the strong result at the 
end of Chapter 2: Whoever owns the truck gets most of the savings. When 
common carrier is involved in CMT, the owner of the products still can share a 
small part of the total savings. 
Therefore, compared to the private fleet owners, the common carriers have 
greater incentives to implement CMT, as their core business and objective is to 
provide transportation service to the public, possibly with less operation cost. 
CMT also encourages the owner of the products (specified by the FOB term used) 




Chapter 4 Computational Testing and 
Extended Comparisons 
In Chapters 2 and 3, we showed the composition of cost savings for each 
party and the total cost savings with numerical examples. To thoroughly study 
the nature of CMT, in this chapter, we enumerate more examples to compare the 
savings through different perspectives. Next, given CMT, we focus on the FOB 
terms and try to understand the impacts on the cost of each party as well as on 
the total cost. We thus capture the preferences of each party, on choosing both 
the FOB terms and their cooperative partners when signing contracts.  
      In our previous studies, we treated the order quantity as fixed, that is, it is 
given by the buyer. However, some of the cost parameters may vary under 
different contractual relationships. Therefore, they may affect the order quantity. 
In this chapter, we will also discuss why and how the changes happen. 
4.1 Impacts of cost savings components 
Under different cases in the earlier chapters, we viewed the seller(s), 
buyer(s), and carrier (if any) each as a group. It was then easy to see that the cost 
savings of each group have several common components. Also, a few cost-
saving expressions have a unique composition that differentiates them from 
others. This section analyzes to what extent these components will affect the cost 




Recall that in Table 1-3: 
Case 1: Private fleet belongs to the seller, FOB destination 
Case 2: Private fleet belongs to the buyer, FOB origin 
Case 3: Common carrier, FOB destination 
Case 4: Common carrier, FOB origin 
4.1.1 Savings of the seller 
First we start from the cost savings of the seller(s). For Cases 2 and 4, the 
cost savings expression below is the sum of the savings of both sellers. We 
continue to use the subscript s to refer to the seller. Now, subscripts 1, 2, 3, and 4 
represent the four cases, respectively. 
The cost savings for the four seller groups are thus: 
TCs1 = (t1 – t)Qhs + (t1 + Δt – t)Q′hs + ac + K + δD                              
TCs2 = hs′Q′Δt                TCs3 = (t1 – t)Qhs + (t1 + Δt – t)Q′hs + 2ac          
TCs4 = (t1 – t)Qhs  + (t1 + Δt – t)Q′hs′ 
The components listed below have appeared in the previous expressions, 
and are assigned the following initial values: 
K + δD = $50            ac = $10 /order           hs = hs′ = $5 /unit/year 
t1 – t = 3 days              Δt = 2 days              Q = 100 units           Q′ = 80 units 
Now we start by varying one of the above components at a time, keeping the 




(1) Transportation cost K + δD varies in the interval [1, 71]. 
 
Figure 4-1: Change in the transportation costs. Cases 2 and 4 indicate the total 
cost savings for the sellers combined; Case 1 and 3 have only a single seller. This 
applies for all figures in Section 4.1.1. 
 
Component K + δD only influences the cost savings of the seller in Case 1, 
and has no effect on sellers in other cases. While K + δD increases, the seller in 
Case 1 saves more due to applying CMT. As show in the figure, the cost savings 
of seller in Case 1 start to surpass that in Case 3 when K + δD reaches $11. This 
means that under FOB destination, the seller tends to use CMT when the expense 
on transportation dominates, which could be the result of long distance.  
(2) Cost of issuing a shipment, ac, varies from 1 to 8, in steps of 1. 
The savings of sellers in Cases 2 and 4 remain the same while the parameter 
ac takes different values. On the contrary, the increment in ac helps sellers in 





































seller in Case 3 is even greater. This is because the seller is fully exempt of such 
cost by using common carriage. 
 
Figure 4-2: Change in shipment issuing cost for all sellers 
(3) Annual costs to hold a unit in inventory at the seller (the paired seller), hs 
(hs′), between values of 5 and 40, in steps of 5. 
Sellers in Cases 1, 3, and 4 all gain extra savings with the raise in the annual 
unit inventory holding cost. The cost savings of seller in Case 4 is a bit lower as 
he is only a part of the seller group. The sellers in Case 2 are indifferent to the 
change in that holding cost. 
Similar to hs, hs′ is able to affect the cost savings of sellers for only two of 
the cases, as Case 1 3 do not include a paired seller. Compared to the sellers in 
Case 2, cost savings of those in Case 4 are more responsive to hs′ due to the use 




































Figure 4-3: Change in hs for all sellers  
 
Figure 4-4: Change in hs′ for all sellers 
(4) Let us vary t1- t, between the values of 1 and 8, in steps of 1. That is the 
difference in time between when the buyer orders under independent decision 


































































t1- t has the same positive impact on the cost savings of sellers in Case 1, 3, 
and 4. However, this time difference does not affect the sellers in Case 2. That is 
a special case because the buyer’s option that sets t equal to t1, thus t1- t = 0 is 
optimal. 
 
Figure 4-5: Change in difference of buyers order time for all sellers 
All the figures indicate that the seller in Case 1 saves the most if CMT is 
chosen as the contractual relationship. Both Case 1 and Case 3, in which the 
FOB term gives the seller privilege to arrange transportation, prove that CMT is 
more preferable from the perspective of the seller, under FOB destination. 
4.1.2 Savings of the buyer 
We consider the cost savings of the buyer(s) next. The expression for cost 




































used to refer to the buyer. The use of subscripts 1, 2, 3, and 4 is the same as in 
Section 4.1.1.  
The cost savings for the four buyer groups are thus: 
TCb1 = – (t1 – t)Qhb  – (t1 + Δt – t)Q′hb′  
TCb2 = ac + K + δD – hbQ′Δt + ab 
TCb3 = – (t1 – t)Qhb – (t1 + Δt – t)Q′hb′  
TCb4 = 2ac – (t1 – t)Qhb – (t1 + Δt – t)Q′hb + ab  
The components listed below have appeared in the previous expressions, 
and are assigned the following initial values: 
K + δD = $50     ac = $10 /order     ab = $10 /order     hb = hb′ = $5 /unit/year 
t1 – t = 3 days              Δt = 2 days              Q = 100 units           Q′ = 80 units 
Now we start by varying one of the above components at a time, but keep 
the remaining parameters at a fixed level. 
(1) Transportation cost K + δD varies in the interval [1, 71]. 
Other than in Case 2, component K + δD has no effect on the cost savings of 
the buyers in other cases. With K + δD increasing, the savings of buyer in Case 2 
grow rapidly due to applying CMT. This means that under FOB origin, any 
factor that would add to the spending on transportation, such as higher cost of 






Figure 4-6: Change in the transportation costs. Cases 1 and 3 indicate the total 
cost savings for the buyers combined; Case 1 and 3 have only a single buyer. This 
applies for all figures in Section 4.1.2.       
(2) Cost of issuing (receiving) a shipment, ac (ab), varies from 1 to 8, in 
steps of 1. 
 
Figure 4-7: Change in shipment-issuing cost for all buyers 
Neither ac nor ab affect the cost savings in Cases 1 and 3, but can help 
































































FOB origin requires that the buyers be responsible for transportation and the 
associated shipment-issuing fee. The impact of ab on the buyers is the same in 
Cases 2 and 4, but ac has greater impact on the buyer in Case 4. The reason is 
that, by using common carriage, the seller is fully exempt from ac. 
 
Figure 4-8: Change in shipment receiving 
(3) Annual costs to hold a unit in inventory at the buyer (the paired buyer), 
hb (hb′), varies between values of 5 and 40, in steps of 5. 
The figures show that hb and hb′ have equal negative effect on the cost 
savings in Case 1 and 3. However, the cost savings in Case 2 and Case 4 is 
irrelevant to hb′, while hb causes lower cost savings for the buyers in both cases, 
especially in Case 4. A reasonable explanation is that the common carrier will 





































Figure 4-9: Change in hb 
 
Figure 4-10: Change in hb′ 
          Similar to the findings in Section 4.1.1, all figures in this part indicate that 
the buyer in Case 2 saves the most if CMT is chosen as the contractual 
































































transportation, making CMT an even better choice for the buyer to gain more 
savings on her total cost. 
 
Conclusion 1: The party responsible for transportation according to the FOB 
term prefers to apply CMT with other partners in the supply chain. The cost 
savings of that party can be maximized, especially when private fleet is used. 
 
4.1.3 Savings of the carrier 
Now look at the common carriers. We use the subscript c to refer to the 
carrier. As there is no common carrier in Cases 1 and 2, we focus on the cost 
savings in the remaining two cases. Thus, only subscripts 3 and 4 are required. 
The cost savings for the two cases with common carrier are thus: 
TCs3 = TCs4 = K + δD – ac 
The expression indicates that the cost savings of the carrier in both cases 
only consist of the transportation cost and the cost of issuing a shipment. As 
shown in Chapter 3, these two components have an opposite influence on the 
savings, while the transportation cost dominates. Therefore, CMT is always a 
good choice for the carrier to save additional operating cost. However, the 
common carrier has no preference in choosing the seller or the buyer as the CMT 





Conclusion 2: The common carrier is indifferent between seller and buyer when 
choosing the CMT partner. 
 
4.1.4 Savings of the supply chain 
We continue to use subscripts 1, 2, 3, and 4 to represent the four cases and 
study the cost savings for seller(s), buyer(s) and carrier as a whole in each case. 
      The total cost savings for the four cases are thus: 
      TC1 = (t1 – t)Q(hs– hb) + (t1 + Δt – t)Q′(hs – hb′) + ac + K + δD                                
      TC2 = ac + K + δD + ab + (hs′ – hb)Q′Δt 
      TC3 = (t1 – t)Q(hs– hb) + (t1 + Δt – t) Q′(hs – hb′) + ac + K + δD 
      TC4 = ac + ab + K + δD + (t1 – t)Q(hs– hb) + (t1 + Δt – t) Q′(hs′– hb) 
      The components listed below have appeared in previous expressions, and are 
assigned the following initial values: 
ac +K + δD = $60;  ab = $10 /order;  hs– hb = hs – hb′ = hs′– hb = $5 /unit/year 
t1 – t = 3 days              Δt = 2 days              Q = 100 units           Q′ = 80 units 
Again we study the impact of the components by varying only one at a time, 
keeping the others at a fixed level. 




When (ac +K + δD) increases, the cost savings for all four cases grow 
steadily with the same slope. Figure 4-11 shows a strong incentive o use CMT: 
to reduce the relevant transportation cost of the entire chain. Among the four 
cases, Case 4 has the greatest cost savings for the whole supply chain. 
 
Figure 4-11: Change in shipment cost for all four cases 
(2) Differences in annual costs to hold a unit in inventory at the seller and at 
the buyer, hs – hb, hs – hb′, and hs′ – hb. Each is varied between values of 5 and 40, 
in steps of 5, respectively. 
Figure 4-12 indicates that the total cost savings of Cases 1, 3, and 4 are 
proportional to the differences in the unit holding cost. Results of the 
computational testing are thus in accordance with the fact that the paired buyer 



























Figure 4-12: Change in hs – hb for all four cases 
 
Figure 4-13 Change in hs – hb′ for all four cases 
As the paired seller is excluded from Cases 1 and 3, a change in hs′ – hb has 
no impact on the cost savings in those two cases. The reason that its impact on 

















































Figure 4-14 Change in hs′ – hb ′ for all four cases 
(3) Cost of receiving a shipment, ab, and the difference of the buyer’s order 
time under independent decision making and the time when the shipment occurs 
under CMT, t1- t. 
 




















































The effect of t1 – t and ab is similar to that described before. It is easy to 
understand by referring to the analysis of the corresponding parameters in part (4) 
of Section 4.1.1. 
4.2 Private fleet vs. Common Carriage 
In this section we look solely at CMT. By comparing the cost of each party 
under different FOB terms, we will find out which FOB term is more favorable 
in terms of seller, buyer, common carriers, and the whole supply chain. 
      We continue to use the cases and subscripts defined in the previous section. 
Among the four cases, Cases 1 and Case 3 use FOB destination, while Cases 2 
and 4 are based on FOB origin. In each pair, the former represents private fleet 
and the latter includes a common carrier. 
4.2.1 Case 1 vs. Case 3  
If we exclude the transportation relevant cost of the seller in Case 1, then 
each of the corresponding parties in the two cases have the same cost 
expressions. However, as indicated in Section 4.1, the tp under common carrier is 
longer than that when using private fleet, that is, tp1 < tp3 in Table 4-1, as the 
information interchange between seller and carrier will take more time. The 
difference in tp makes it more expensive for the seller to implement CMT by 
hiring a common carrier. Common carriage is also more expensive from the 




of transportation is used. Therefore, it is more cost effective if the seller uses his 
own fleet for CMT than uses common carriage. 
Table 4-1: Cost comparison under FOB destination 
 Cost under private fleet – Cost under common carriage 
Seller hp(Q + Q′)(tp1 – tp3) < 0 
Buyers Both are 0 
Total hp(Q + Q′)(tp1 – tp3) < 0 
 
4.2.2 Case 2 vs. Case 4  
The cost differences between cases applying FOB Origin are bigger than 
those of the first pair. The sellers spend less on holding inventory when the 
common carrier is hired by the buyer. As a result, the sellers may prefer to use 
common carriage. However, according to Table 4-2, using common carrier 
actually costs the buyer more. If the buyer does not have a private fleet, then 
hiring a common carrier works for both herself and the sellers. If the buyer 
already has access to private carriage, it is more reasonable that she operates the 
self-managed transportation. 
The difference in total cost of the two cases can be positive or negative, 
depending on whether the buyer has cost-wise advantage over the sellers in 
inventory management. However, in real life, the pipeline inventory holding cost 




tp2 < tp4, because of the extra time spent on information interchange between 
buyer and carrier. Therefore, hp(Q + Q′)(tp2 – tp4) < 0, i.e. the pipeline inventory 
holding cost of Case 2 is lower. This means that, when CMT is employed under 
conditions of FOB origin, the buyer prefers that private fleet be used (Naturally, 
this is the buyer’s own truck). 
Table 4-2: Cost comparison under FOB origin 
 Cost under private fleet – Cost under common carriage 
Sellers (t1 – t)Qhs > 0 and (t1– t)Q′hs′ > 0 
Buyer hp(Q + Q′)(tp2 – tp4) – (t1 – t)Qhb – (t1 – t)Q′hb < 0 
Total hp(Q + Q′)(tp2 – tp4) – (t1 – t)Q(hb– hs) – (t1 – t) Q′(hb– hs′) 
 
In general, compared to hiring a common carrier, using a private fleet can 
help the party in charge of transportation spend less on that operation. This 
finding corresponds to the statement in Conclusion 1. Note that this does not 
mean that common carriage is not preferable. If there is no available private fleet, 
common carrier is also a nice choice, yielding cost savings compared to 
independent decision making.  
4.3 The impact on EOQ of different FOB terms 
In Chapter 1, we assumed that the buyers apply the EOQ model to decide 
the order quantity. That order amount is a parameter rather than a variable, 




discussing and making comparisons, we therefore did not change the order 
quantity. Instead we used the same order quantity in each case in the numerical 
examples, in order to make it easier to compare. However, we should point out 
that the order quantity generated from the EOQ models does depend on the FOB 
terms used. In this section we discuss why and how this variation occurs.  
 
The EOQ formula is          , in which: 
P   Price of item = Freight charge per item + Product value 
I   Inventory holding cost (% of the Price of item) 
D   Demand per period 
S   Fixed cost incurred to order regardless of quantity 
 
Given a seller and a buyer, we write the following expressions for the order 
quantities under different FOB scenarios. Subscripts d and o are used to refer to 
FOB destination and FOB origin, respectively. 
EOQ under FOB Destination:              , and EOQ under FOB 
Origin:              . Note that Pd > Po, as Pd includes the seller’s freight 
charge, and Sd < So, as the buyer needs to bear the transportation operating cost. 





Conclusion 3: The order quantity under FOB origin is greater than that under 
FOB destination. 
Define FC as the freight charge per item, then: So = Sd + FC, and Pd = Po + 
FC. If CMT is implemented, Pd and So will decrease due to the improvement in 
distribution, through higher chances in consolidation, either accomplished by 
private fleet or common carrier. That is, FC is going to be smaller, i.e. will move 
to the left in Figure 4-16. As a result, Qd is increasing, while Qo is decreasing. 
The gap between those two EOQs is getting narrower with the reduction in 
transportation cost. 
 
Set D = 100, I = 5%, Sd = 3, Po = 10. The following figure shows the 
variation in the two EOQs under different FOB terms when FC is changing. 
 



















Conclusion 4: Applying CMT under FOB destination increases the order 
quantity of the buyer, and correspondingly lowers the rate of ordering. Under 





Chapter 5 Summary and Conclusions 
5.1 Summary 
In this thesis we explored the possibility to apply a supply chain 
collaboration policy in the field of transportation and distribution. With reference 
to vendor managed inventory (VMI), we named the new policy “Carrier 
Managed Transportation” (CMT). As opposed to the traditional approach, where 
the shipper or consignee decides when to request shipments of the products, in 
CMT, the carrier will make these decisions on their behalf through the sharing of 
information on the timing of planned replenishments. 
Based on the Incoterms and carrier choices, we divided CMT into four cases 
that are generally observed in the transportation business. They are: Private fleet 
belongs to the seller, FOB destination (Case 1); Private fleet belongs to the buyer, 
FOB origin (Case 2); Common carrier, FOB destination (Case 3); and Common 
carrier, FOB origin (Case 4). 
We then made a few assumptions and applied two main frameworks to 
analyze the cost of each party and the entire supply chain. In the frameworks, the 
concept of time window was introduced to provide a basis for information 
sharing, and to guarantee that the business is processed on schedule. The cost 
components incorporated in our model include: the costs of on-site inventory 




receiving goods and of order preparation. Depend upon the case, there may be an 
extra seller or buyer involved in the framework, to provide the chance for 
consolidation. The analysis was done for both CMT and another distribution 
policy called “independent decision making”. The results under the two policies 
were compared to examine the possible benefits of CMT. We further compared 
the impacts of choosing FOB terms and cooperative partners. 
Our findings include one strong result and four conclusions: 
A strong result: Whoever owns the truck gets most of the savings. 
Conclusion 1: The party responsible for transportation according to the 
FOB term prefers to apply CMT with other partners in the supply chain. The cost 
savings of that party can be maximized, especially when private fleet is used. 
Conclusion 2: The common carrier is indifferent between seller and buyer 
when choosing the CMT partner. 
Conclusion 3: The order quantity under FOB origin is greater than that 
under FOB destination. 
Conclusion 4: Applying CMT under FOB destination increases the order 
quantity of the buyer, and correspondingly lowers the rate of ordering. Under 
FOB origin, CMT leads to more frequent replenishments with a lower quantity 
per order. 





From the previous studies we can draw the following conclusions: 
(1) Carrier Managed Transportation has great potential in shredding the 
transportation cost in the supply chain. Thus, any party that has advantages on 
transportation over the supply chain will tend to use CMT as the collaboration 
policy. 
(2) CMT leads to centralized decision making, especially when common 
carrier is in the transportation system. Each party can focus on its core business, 
and the common carrier plays a role of the professional logistics service provider. 
From the perspective of the shipper and the consignee, other than transportation 
activities, they outsource part of their decision making power to the carrier as 
well. 
(3) CMT is applicable in industry. Although the examples showed that some 
parties are worse-off in certain situations, in fact the main disadvantage they face 
is to bear inventory holding cost for a few days more. In real life, companies 
does not stress on such trivial extra expenses. Moreover, CMT can provide long-
term collaborative relationships and discounts to compensate their loss.  
As for the common carrier, we proved that it has no preference choosing 
business partners. The common carriers can enjoy customer variety, and the 




(4) CMT will affect inventory planning of the chain members. If CMT is 
implemented, the order quantity and frequency will change according to different 
terms used. As a result, the inventory design needs to be modified to adjust the 
changes in the previous factors. The change in inventory settings may further 
influence chain members outside the transportations system. Therefore, it is 
suggested that the parties choose the FOB terms carefully with their business 
partners. 
(5) Applying CMT tends to transfer the inventory holding cost to the 
downstream chain members, i.e. from the seller to the buyer, no matter what type 
of transportation is used. 
CMT allows the master of the supply chain to take initiative and gain more 
benefits. If a company has advantages in managing the supply chain, it could 
consider CMT to further reduce its spending and enhance the relationships with 
its partners. Our findings can be a source of reference to help companies decide 
if CMT works for them. 
The above conclusions are based on the assumptions made in Section 1.6.1. 
However, even if some of the assumptions do not hold, CMT is still beneficial. 
We give two examples to show how the changes in assumptions will affect the 
results of CMT. 
We assumed that the demand is constant and deterministic. If the market 




prevent a stockout. Therefore, the reorder point will need to increase. In addition, 
buyer B (facing probabilistic demand) would like the time t2 to move further to 
the left (e.g. see Figure 2-2), meaning a consolidated shipment could be 
dispatched sooner. The relevant time interval now has a greater width, but the 
carrier will prefer to dispatch a consolidated load at a time closer to the left end 
point. These variations do not change the basis of our calculations. However, 
determination of those cost savings under probabilistic demand will not be as 
easy to obtain as when demand is fixed. 
Another assumption is that there is no need to break orders into small loads. 
However, in real life, splitting orders is often the case, e.g. due to truck capacity. 
In such circumstances, the buyers will need to have better and more information 
sharing with the carrier to implement CMT. From the perspective of the carrier, 
there will be a greater number of orders. Thus, consolidation will become even 
more important, and if performed well, could bring the carrier additional profits. 
5.3 Future Research 
In this thesis we used a simple mathematical model to illustrate the concept 
of Carrier Managed Transportation and how it affects the cost responsibilities of 
each party in the transportation system. For further research, one can extend this 
model by adding in multiple sellers and buyers, introducing probability when 




is fixed, etc. One can also consider different inventory management policies to 
handle the changes in demand. For the extensions that are much more 
complicated, computer simulation can be used to aid the modeling process and 
output analysis. 
Another choice is to evolve in the shipment quantity as a decision variable 
in CMT. In our model, there is no break bulk of the orders. However, according 
to our definition of CMT, it is possible that the carrier dispatch the products in 
several shipments, as long as the clients get replenished on time. In such case, 
the factors affecting consolidation become more complicated, but the potential of 
CMT will be explained distinctively. 
It is also an interesting topic if CMT is combined with VMI. Among the 
four cases discussed in this thesis, Private fleet belongs to the seller, FOB 
destination (Case 1) may be the best fit for combination of the two policies. 
Although CMT is a supply chain collaboration policy, the party who makes 
decisions is still biased. That is, it will maximize its own profit, sometimes 
sacrificing the interests of other parties. Therefore, joint decisions in CMT could 
be discussed to show the differences in performance if there is a neutral party 
that makes decisions from the system-wide perspective. In addition, a method for 
obtaining the best price discount can be established and applied in CMT to 
compensate the parties that are worse-off. The price discount could be a part of 




Appendix A    Numerical Examples for Private Fleet 
In Appendices A and B, we include the graphs that compare the various 
cases when additional parameters are varied. 
Private fleet belongs to the seller, FOB destination (Case 1) 
TCs1 – TCs2 = (t1 – t)Qhs + (t1 + Δt – t)Q′hs + ac + K + δD > 0 
TCb1 – TCb2 = – (t1 – t)Qhb ≤ 0 
TCb′1– TCb′2 = – (t1 + Δt – t)Q′hb′ ≤ 0 
TC1 – TC2 = (t1 – t)Q(hs– hb) + (t1 + Δt – t)Q′(hs – hb′) + ac + K + δD 
 
 (1) Difference of buyer b’s order time under independent decision making 
and the order time of buyer b′ under CMT, t1- t, between values of 0 and 7, in 
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(2) Carrier (seller)’s cost K, of initiating a dispatch. Variation between 
values of 5 and 100, in steps of 5. 
 
 
(3) Distance between the region of seller and the region of buyers, D, 











































(4) Transportation cost, δ, between values of 0 and 10, in steps of 1. 
 
 
(5) Fixed cost of issuing a shipment, ac, between values of 0 and 100, in 
steps of 10. 
 
 
(6) Annual cost to hold a unit in inventory at the seller, hs, between values of 
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When hs<1.5, hs is smaller than both hb and hb′; when 1.5<hs<1.8, hb <hs< hb′; 
when hs>1.5, hs is larger than both hb and hb′. 
 
 
(7) Annual cost to hold a unit in inventory at the buyer, hb, between values 
of 0 and 5, in steps of 0.1. In such condition, hs- hb will decrease from 1.2 to -3.8. 
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(8) Annual cost to hold a unit in inventory at buyer b′, hb′, between values of 
0 and 5, in steps of 0.1. In such condition, hs- hb′ will decrease from 1.2 to -3.8. 
When hb′<1.2, hb′ is smaller than hs; when hb′>1.2, hb′ is larger than hs. 
 
 
(9) Differences in total cost as a function of the quantity Q, ordered by the 
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(10) Quantity ordered by the buyer, Q′, between values of 0 and 800, in 




Private fleet belongs to the buyer, FOB origin (Case 2) 
TCs1 – TCs2 = 0 
TCs′1– TCs′2 = hs′Q′Δt 
TCb1 – TCb2 = ac + K + δD – hbQ′Δt + ab>0 
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(1) Carrier (buyer)’s cost of initiating a dispatch, K, between values of 5 and 
100, in steps of 5. 
 
 
(2) Distance between the region of sellers and the region of buyer, D, 
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(3) Transportation cost, δ, between values of 0 and 10, in steps of 1. 
 
 
(4) Fixed cost of issuing a shipment, ac, between values of 0 and 100, in 
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(5) Fixed cost of receiving the products, ab, between values of 0 and 100, in 
steps of 10. 
 
 
(6) Annual cost to hold a unit in inventory at the seller s′, hs′, between values 
of 0 and 5, in steps of 0.1. Thus hs′ - hb ϵ (-1.5, 3.5). When hs′<1.5, hs′ is smaller 
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(7) Annual cost to hold a unit in inventory at the buyer, hb, between values 
of 0 and 5, in steps of 0.1. In such condition, hs′- hb will decrease from 1.8 to -3.2. 
When hb<1.8, hb is smaller than hs; when hb>1.8, hb is larger than hs. 
 
 
(8) Quantity ordered by the buyer for product p′, Q′, between values of 0 and 
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Appendix B    Numerical Examples for Common Carrier 
Common carrier, FOB destination (Case 3) 
TCs1 – TCs2 = (t1 – t)Qhs + (t1 + Δt – t)Q′hs + 2ac > 0 
TCb1 – TCb2 = – (t1 – t)Qhb ≤ 0 
TCb′1– TCb′2 = – (t1 + Δt – t)Q′hb′ ≤ 0 
TCc1 – TCc2 = K + δD – ac 
TC1 – TC2 = (t1 – t)Q(hs– hb) + (t1 + Δt – t) Q′(hs – hb′) + ac + K + δD 
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 (2) K. Variation between values of 5 and 100, in steps of 5. 
 
 
























































(4) δ, between values of 0 and 10, in steps of 1. 
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(6) hs, between values of 5 and 10, in steps of 0.1. 
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(8) hb′, between values of 5 and 10, in steps of 0.1. 
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Common carrier, FOB origin (Case 4) 
TCs1 – TCs2 = (t1 – t)Qhs ≥ 0 
TCs′1– TCs′2 = (t1 + Δt – t)Q′hs′ > 0 
TCb1 – TCb2 = 2ac – (t1 – t)Qhb – (t1 + Δt – t)Q′hb + ab 
TCc1 – TCc2 = K + δD – ac 
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(1) t1- t, between values of 0 and 7, in steps of 1. 
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(3) D, between values of 0 and 1000, in steps of 100. 
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(5) ac, between values of 0 and 100, in steps of 10. 
 
 









0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
ac

















5 5.3 5.6 5.9 6.2 6.5 6.8 7.1 7.4 7.7 8 8.3 8.6 8.9 9.2 9.5 9.8
hs









(7) hs′, between values of 5 and 10, in steps of 0.1. 
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(9) Q, between values of 0 and 1000, in steps of 100. 
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